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Abstract—
Modern applications increasingly interact with web APIs – reusable components, deployed and operated outside the application, and
accessed over the network. Their existence, arguably, spurs application innovations, making it easy to integrate data or functionalities.
While previous work has analyzed the ecosystem of web APIs and their design, little is known about web API quality at runtime. This
gap is critical, as qualities including availability, latency, or security can severely impact applications and user experience.
In this paper, we revisit a 3-month, geo-distributed benchmark of popular web APIs, originally performed in 2015. We repeat this
benchmark in 2018 and compare results from these two benchmarks regarding availability and latency. We furthermore introduce new
results from assessing web API security measurements, collected both in 2015 and 2018, and results from our attempts to reach out to
API providers with the results from our 2015 experiments. Our extensive experiments show that web API qualities vary 1.) based on the
geo-distribution of clients, 2.) during our individual experiments, and 3.) between the two experiments. Our findings provide evidence to
foster the discussion around web API quality, and can act as a basis for the creation of tools and approaches to mitigate quality issues.
Index Terms—Web APIs, Benchmarking, Quality of Service
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1 INTRODUCTION
©2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future
media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
TODAY, mobile, web, or even desktop applications reg-ularly rely on third-party data or functionalities, which
they consume through web Application Programming Inter-
faces (web APIs). Web APIs provide these applications with
otherwise inaccessible resources such as access to global so-
cial networks (e.g., web APIs provided by Twitter, Facebook,
or LinkedIn), advanced machine-learning capabilities (e.g.,
web APIs provided by IBM Watson or Google Cloud AI), or
complex transaction processing (e.g., web APIs by Stripe or
PayPal for payment processing or the Flight Booking API).
Today, application developers can build on...
• ubiquitous technologies, for example the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or Asynchronous JavaScript and
XML (AJAX),
• architectural styles, for example the Representational
State Transfer (REST) [1],
• de-facto standards for describing web APIs, for example
the OpenAPI Specification1,
• research results, for example from service-oriented com-
puting, cloud computing, or mash-ups, and finally
• a myriad of web API client libraries in any established
programming language,
so that integrating web APIs with an application no longer
poses a technological challenge. Therefore, we now see
thousands of public APIs as well as applications using
them [2].
In consequence, though, application developers now
heavily rely on third-party entities beyond their control
sphere for core functionality of their applications. This can
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have impacts on applications’ user experience. For example,
erroneous integration of core application capabilities, e.g.,
a payment service, via APIs can impede end user experi-
ence [3]. High request latency can lead to slow application
response times, which have been found to disrupt users’
flow of thought or eventually cause loss of attention [4].
A long-term experiment performed by Google showed that
increasing response times artificially from 100ms to 400ms
did measurably decrease the average amount of searches
performed by users [5]. User experience and, hence, applica-
tion reputation is thus directly affected by actions and non-
actions of the API providers. As another example, APIs may
be discontinued or changed without notice, thus disabling
applications. Previous work found that mobile applications
silently fail and, in cases, even crash when confronted with
mutated (e.g., adapted or faulty) web API responses [6].
In sum, web API endpoints2 often present themselves as
black-boxes with volatile qualities – i.e., availability, latency,
security, or usage limitations – to consumers.
Based on this observation, in 2016, we published a
study on web API quality [8], where we described our
findings from an experiment of benchmarking 15 endpoints
of diverse web APIs for three months from geo-distributed
clients. Core results were that availability and latency highly
depend on the geo-origin of requests as well as the protocol
used (HTTP vs. HTTPS). For this paper, we extend, repeat,
and correct our previous study3. Namely, we repeated all
experiments in 2018, reanalyze old and new availability
and latency measurements, analyze yet unpublished mea-
surements on provider security preferences, and present the
results of trying to contact the providers of all benchmarked
APIs with the goal of (i) finding explanations for the ob-
servations from our 2016 paper and (ii) to assess availability
2. We denote an endpoint to be the combination of a resource,
identified by a URL, and an HTTP method as proposed in [7].
3. Where applicable, this paper reuses parts of the text material and
figures from our previous publication [8].
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2and quality of customer service. We thus make the following
contributions:
1) We extend our previous measurement method to also
collect information on Transport Layer Security (TLS)
cipher suite preferences of providers.
2) We report findings on how TLS cipher suite preferences
of providers evolved over time in both our 2015 and
2018 measurements.
3) We report detailed findings from analyzing and com-
paring our 2015 and 2018 latency and availability mea-
surements.
4) We discuss the results of reaching out to the providers
of all benchmarked APIs about our original findings
from 2015.
This paper is structured as follows: we present back-
ground on web APIs, possible failures when consuming
them, and web API qualities in Section 2. We present the
implementation of our benchmarking client and the design
of our experiments – both with regard to benchmarked
API endpoints and experiment setup – in Section 3. In
the following sections, we compare findings from the 2015
and 2018 experiments, addressing availability in Section 4,
latency in Section 5, and security in Section 6. We present
findings from reaching out to API providers with our 2015
results in Section 7. We discuss this work’s threats to validity
and implications for application developers in Section 8.
After presenting related work in Section 9, we conclude in
Section 10.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give an overview of selected qualities
in web APIs and discuss how they can be measured. For
this purpose, we start with a description of individual
steps in performing web API requests (Section 2.1) and
potential root causes of failures (Section 2.2). Afterwards,
we characterize the qualities which we have studied for this
paper (Section 2.3).
2.1 Interaction with Web APIs
Web APIs expose data, e.g., a user profile or an image file,
and functionalities, e.g., a payment process or the manage-
ment of a virtual machine through a resource abstraction.
This abstraction enables users to manipulate these resources
without requiring insight into the underlying implementa-
tion.
Developers can access Web APIs through the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which again uses the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) for error-free, complete, and ordered
data transmission on the transport layer, and the Internet
Protocol (IP) at the network layer. Figure 1 illustrates the
steps involved in a typical HTTP request4.
The resources exposed by an API are identified by unified
resource locators (URLs), describing the scheme to be used
for interaction, the server Internet address, and the specific
resource identifier. The semantics of interactions with a
resource depend upon the HTTP method, e.g., GET, POST, or
DELETE. Before a client can send a request to the server that
4. For simplicity’s sake, we do not include possible complications like
proxies, keep alive connections, caches, or gateways in this Figure.
API 
Web Server 
Local DNS 
Cache 
Client 
Device 
Authoritative 
DNS Server 
1 2 3 
Fig. 1. Overview of the Steps Involved in Sending an HTTP Request
offers the web API, client and server need to establish a TCP
connection. For this purpose, the client first sends a lookup
request for the URL of the server to a Domain Name Service
(DNS) server which returns the IP address and port number
of the target host. If available, IP address and port may be
returned from a local cache (step 1); otherwise, an external
DNS authority is consulted (step 2). Afterwards, the client
opens a socket connection to the server, i.e., it initiates TCP’s
three-way handshake, thus, establishing a TCP connection
(step 3). Based on this connection, multiple HTTP requests
with application data can be sent to the server.
If additional security is required, the client will typically
use HTTPS which introduces the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol5 between HTTP and TCP/IP. TLS has two
main phases: a negotiation phase and a bulk data transfer
phase. In the negotiation phase, the server authenticates
itself through its X.509 certificate. Afterwards, the client
sends its list of supported cipher suites (a combination of
symmetric encryption algorithm and a message authentica-
tion code (MAC)) to the server which then selects a cipher
suite supported by both client and server and responds ac-
cordingly. Using asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA) and key
exchange protocols (e.g., DHE), client and server also agree
on a symmetric key and other TLS sessions parameters.
After this TLS handshake has been completed, the server
signals a change to the bulk data transfer phase. During
that phase, each HTTP request is broken down into data
packets which are – based on the agreed session parameters
– encrypted and signed before transmission over the net-
work. Cipher suite and protocol version determine whether
encrypt-then-MAC or the reverse order is used. The recip-
ient can then reassemble the original request and verify its
integrity based on the received MAC.
2.2 Sources of Failures
Considering the typical HTTP request flow described in
section 2.1, a number of possible breakpoints emerge at
which a request may fail. As we will see, while some of
these are in control of a web API provider, others are not.
A failed DNS lookup is caused by attempting to look
up a host for which no DNS entry exists or by a network
partitioning which causes the lookup request to an authori-
tative DNS server to time out. The first error source is rather
unlikely for web API requests with the correct URL, as it
would either imply the disappearance of the API’s host
altogether or indicate problems in the DNS system itself.
Typically, a failed lookup results in a timeout error reported
to the client. The second error source appears only in case
that the network is not available and the DNS entry is not
yet cached locally.
5. TLS has largely replaced its predecessor SSL which is typically
supported only for compatibility with old clients.
3A client connection error appears if no TCP connection
can be established between the client and the server hosting
the web API. Reasons for this error are network partitioning
or that the server is in a state where it cannot accept
connections (for example, because it crashed).
In the case of HTTPS, a request can also fail if authenti-
cation of the server is not possible due to certificate issues
or if there is no cipher suite supported by both client and
server.
A client error appears if the request sent by the client
cannot be processed by the server. One reason for client
errors is that the requested resource cannot be found on
the server. Furthermore, users may not be authorized to
access the requested resource. The client may not have been
aware of authentication mechanism like basic authentication
or OAuth or may not own proper credentials. Furthermore,
providers may deny authorization for specific clients if their
usage of an API exceeds certain thresholds. A broad range
of client errors are considered by HTTP and should result
in the server sending 4xx status codes. While these errors
are attested to the client, it is important to note that their
appearance can be tightly related to actions of the web API
provider. For example, many changes on the server, e.g., in-
troducing authentication, removing or renaming resources,
or changing request formatting, cause existing clients to
malfunction, i.e., the client error is in fact caused by the
web API provider.
A server error appears if the server fails to process an
otherwise correct request. Reasons for server errors may
include failed lookups for resources in databases or errors in
the execution of functionalities. Server errors are, similar to
client errors, considered by HTTP and should result in the
server sending 5xx status codes.
2.3 Qualities
Systems have a number of properties. These can be func-
tional, i.e., describe the abilities of said system, or non-
functional, i.e., describe the quality of said system. Quality
describes how “good” or “bad” a system fulfills its tasks
along several dimensions6 – the qualities [9].
There is a plethora of qualities that we can see in web
APIs. Examples range from availability and performance,
to security, reliability, scalability, cost, or correctness (of
results). All these qualities are inherently connected through
complex direct and indirect tradeoff relationships [10]. In
this paper, we focus on three qualities: availability, perfor-
mance, and (transport layer) security.
2.3.1 Availability
Generally, availability describes the likelihood of a system
– here, a web API – being able to respond to requests.
Providing a concise definition of availability, though, is non-
trivial: Does an API have to send correct responses or does it
suffice if it is still able to tell about current problems? For this
paper, we distinguish three different kinds of availability to
consider these questions:
Pingability describes whether there is anything “alive”
at the API provider’s site. This may be a load balancer or
6. It depends on the respective quality what “good” or “bad” implies.
even a fault endpoint. For a single machine deployment,
pingability describes whether said machine is reachable at
an operating system level. Pingability is fulfilled if, at the
web API’s URL, some entity responds to basic low level
requests, e.g., ping requests (using the ICMP protocol).
Accessibility describes whether the resource represented
by the web API is still accessible but not necessarily able to
fulfill its task. For a single machine deployment, accessibility
describes whether the web server component is reachable
but does not require the hosted application logic to be
accessible. A web API is accessible if it responds to HTTP
requests using one of the predefined HTTP status codes.
Successability describes whether the web API is fully
functional. For a single host deployment, it requires the
application logic to be working7. Hence, we define success-
ability to be fulfilled if a web API responds to requests using
2xx or 3xx status codes.
2.3.2 Performance
Performance has two dimensions: latency and throughput.
Latency describes the amount of time between the start of a
request at the client and the end of receiving a response, also
at the client. Throughput, on the other hand, describes the
number of requests a web API is handling at a given point in
time. Typically, throughput measurements try to determine
the maximum throughput, i.e., the maximum number of
requests that a web API is able to handle without timeouts.
Usually, these two dimensions are interconnected: If the
load increases towards maximum throughput, then latency
will increase. If this is not the case, then the system be-
hind the web API is typically referred to as elastically
scalable [11], [12].
2.3.3 Security
Security is typically characterized along several dimensions
– here, we will focus on the two arguably most relevant
for TLS: confidentiality and integrity. Basically, confidentiality
describes whether unauthorized entities are able to access
the content of API requests, and integrity asserts that trans-
mitted data packets cannot be manipulated without the
manipulation being noticed.
It is hard to quantify how secure a web API interaction
is with regards to confidentiality and integrity as this would
require knowledge on all possible attack vectors. However,
it is possible to interpret the selected cipher suites of actual
API requests and the general preference order of the API
provider and distinguish between weaker and stronger ci-
pher suites.
Cipher suites list cryptographic algorithms for use in
TLS (and previously SSL). A cipher suite generally names
the algorithms to use for 1) key exchange, 2) authentication,
3) bulk encryption (this algorithm is also called the “ci-
pher”), and 4) message authentication code (MAC; which is
used to ensure the integrity of a message). Servers typically
support a ranked list of cipher suites, from which one suite
to use is agreed-on with the client during the TLS handshake
procedure.
7. Please, note, that successability does not say anything about cor-
rectness of results.
4To reason about the security of different cipher suites, we
device the following heuristic cipher suite security score SCS
per cipher suite:
SCS = baseScore+ keyLengthModifier
where baseScore is 1 if modern algorithms are used, 0 if no
perfect forward secrecy is guaranteed, and −1 if a generally
known-to-be-weak algorithm (e.g., RC4, DES) is used. The
keyLengthModifier is 0.1 if the selected cipher has a
strength of at least 256 bit. The idea of these scores is not
to make absolute statements about the security provided by
a suite, but rather to be able to compare servers supporting
different sets of cipher suites. For that purpose, based on
individual cipher suite security scores, we devise the server
security score SS of a server to be:
SS =
∑
i∈CS
SSCi
ri
where CS is the ranked list of cipher suites supported by
the server (i.e., the ordered list of server preferences), SSCi
is the cipher suite security score of a suite i, and ri is the
rank of the same suite i. In other words, the server security
score is higher when modern cipher suites are near the top
of the ranked list and lower when weak cipher suites are
included, especially near the top.
As a toy example, consider a server whose cipher
suite preference list is 1.) ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384,
2.) ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA, and 3. RC4-SHA), which
have cipher suite security scores, respectively, of 1.1, 1,
and −1. The resulting server security score would be
(1.1/1) + (1/2) + (−1/3) = 1.267.
3 EXPERIMENT DESIGN
In this section, we give an overview of our experiment
setup. We start with the implementation of the bench-
marking client (Section 3.1), followed by a description of
chosen API endpoints (Section 3.2) before continuing with
the parameters of our experiment setup (Section 3.3).
3.1 Benchmark Implementation
We have built our measurement system around the quality
definitions described in Section 2.3: Pingability can be mea-
sured by sending a ping request to the respective endpoint
using the standard Linux ping implementation; accessibility
and successability can be measured by sending HTTP or
HTTPS requests. This also allows us to track request la-
tencies. Originally, we also planned to measure throughput
(and, thus, also scalability since we do not have any insight
into the API provider’s implementation) by sending large
numbers of concurrent requests. For our experiments, we re-
frained from doing so since most provider’s terms of service
explicitly rule out any kind of usage which would resemble
a DDoS attack. Therefore, we also recommend strongly that
application developers who plan to roll out their application
to large user groups should contact the API providers about
throughput limits – no matter whether they are using a
free or a paid/rate-limited API. Our HTTP/HTTPS client is
implemented in Java, using the basic HttpURLConnection
class.
TABLE 1
Benchmarked API Endpoints and Supported Protocols in 2015 [8].
API Name ICMP/HTTP/HTTPS Request Meaning
Apple iTunes X / X / X Get links to resources on artists
Amazon S3 - / X / X Get file list for the 1000 genomes
public data set
BBC - / X / - Get the playlist for BBC Radio 1
Consumer Fi-
nance
X / X / X Retrieve data on consumer com-
plaints on financial products in
the US
Flickr X / X / X Get list of recent photo and video
uploads
Google Books X / - / X Get book metadata by ISBN
Google Maps X / X / X Query location information by
address
MusicBrainz X / X / X Retrieve information about
artists and their music
OpenWeather
Map
X / X / - Get weather data by address
Postcodes.io X / X / X Get location information based
on UK zip codes
Police.uk.co - / X / X Retrieve street level crime data
from the UK
Spotify X / X / X Get information on a given artist
Twitter X / X / - Get the number of mentions for
a given URL
Wikipedia X / X / X Retrieve a Wikipedia article
Yahoo X / X / X Get weather data by address
For security measurements, we obtain the list of cipher
suites offered by API servers for HTTPS requests. Since,
in our scenario, the API endpoint decides on the cipher
suite which then offers different levels of confidentiality and
integrity, we also propose to measure the preference order
of the API provider, i.e., does the provider prioritize fast but
less secure cipher suites or not. For this, we use the open
source project cipherscan8.
Our measurement toolkit is parameterized with a list of
API endpoints. Based on this parameter list, it periodically
sends ping, HTTP, and HTTPS requests. The toolkit then
logs detailed results which are analyzed when the bench-
mark run has been completed. Our open source prototype
for benchmarking web APIs is publicly available9.
In an initial test run before the 2018 experiment, we
noticed that the Java VM running our toolkit crashed or the
virtual machine was restarted by Amazon. This forced us to
restart the experiment. To be able to detect such crashes very
fast, we extended our original toolkit with an embedded
HTTP server to expose an endpoint which returns the latest
measurement results for all APIs and protocols as a single
page HTML site upon GET requests. We could then use the
commercial Uptime Robot service10 to monitor this endpoint
and inform us about tool crashes so that we could if nec-
essary restart the respective machine as soon as possible.
We had no incidence reported by Uptime Robot during our
2018 data collection. More details about the potential threat
to validity of dying benchmarking clients are presented in
Sections 8.1 and 8.2.
8. https://github.com/jvehent/cipherscan
9. https://github.com/dbermbach/web-api-bench
10. See https://uptimerobot.com/
53.2 Analyzed Web API Endpoints
Typically, web API endpoints require clients to authenticate
to interact with the resources they expose. Authentication
mechanisms include basic authentication, where a username
and password or a token have to be sent with every request,
or the more frequently used OAuth. OAuth allows clients
to access web APIs without having to expose users’ creden-
tials. OAuth, however, requires eventual human interaction
to authorize client applications for requests and involves
additional requests to establish authentication. While this is
feasible for actual applications, it is prohibitive for bench-
marking purposes. One way to circumvent the need for
human interaction is to “automate” it through the use of
people services [13], but latency and availability measure-
ments would then become entirely meaningless. Another
possibility is to make requests using API-specific software
development kits (SDKs), which hide such complexities from
the client. However, SDKs are not readily available for all
APIs. Furthermore, correctly interpreting benchmark results
obtained using SDKs would require us to fully understand
their inner workings (e.g., through code-reviews) and even-
tually to align them for comparability. All in all, we thus
decided to perform our experiments with unauthenticated
API endpoints only. Focusing on these endpoints allows us
to control the parameters influencing our measurements,
e.g., as we avoid multiple roundtrips (possibly to third-party
entities) for authentication.
Already for our original paper, we identified 15 unau-
thenticated API endpoints (11 accessible via HTTP or
HTTPS, 3 accessible only via HTTP, and one accessible
only via HTTPS) from a variety of different providers with
regards to company sizes, country of origin, local or global
target users, public or private sector. We specifically in-
cluded some of the most well-known providers like Google,
Apple, Amazon, and Twitter. Table 1 gives an overview of
the web API endpoints which we originally selected for our
experiments in 2015, and of the protocols they supported.
Already during our 2015 experiments, two endpoints
became permanently unavailable [8]. Since then there have
been additional changes as some resources, their endpoints,
or even whole APIs that we originally targeted were no
longer accessible in 2018. Table 2 indicates all changes to
the HTTP and HTTPS endpoints for the anonymized APIs.
Notably, some HTTP endpoints available in 2015 seem to
have been deprecated since. In one case, for API 4, the
originally targeted resource seized to exist, and we had
to replace it (with an, unfortunately, much smaller one).
Table 2 also indicates changes in response size between
2015 and 2018. Response sizes evolved significantly, even for
cases where the API, endpoint, or even targeted resource re-
mained constant. For some APIs, we cannot report response
size changes as we were no longer able to complete requests,
whether with HTTP or HTTPS.
Please, note: In this work, we want to highlight unex-
pected behavior and unpredictability of web API quality
but we do not aim to discredit individual API providers.
For this reason, we decided to anonymize our results and
will, for the remainder of this paper, only refer to these
API endpoints as API-1 to API-15. There is no correlation
between the identifiers and the order of API endpoints in
TABLE 2
Changes in API Endpoints between 2015 and 2018
API HTTP change HTTPS change Resp. size
1 - - -3.1%
2 no longer available - n.a.
3 - - +12.48%
4 new resource new resource -99.92%
5 - - +254.56%
6 - - -13.52%
7 - - +25.57%
8 - - -45.68%
9 - - +42.85%
10 - - +16.03%
11 - - +50.03%
12 no longer available - n.a.
13 no longer available no longer available n.a.
14 no longer available - n.a.
15 no longer available - +38.53%
Table 1 but we use the same mapping as in our 2016 pa-
per [8]. However, we will reveal this mapping information
upon request if we are convinced that the information will
not be used to discredit individual providers.
3.3 Experiment Setup
To analyze whether web API quality varies depending on
the geo-origin of the request, we deployed our toolkit in
several locations. For this purpose, we used one Amazon
EC2 instance in each of the following Amazon Web Services
(AWS) regions: US East (Virginia), US West (Oregon), EU
(Ireland), Asia (Singapore), Asia (Sydney), Asia (Tokyo), and
South America (Sao Paulo).
We configured our toolkit to send ping, HTTP, and
HTTPS requests every 5 minutes, but each starting at a
different timestamp for the first request to avoid interfer-
ence. Ping was configured to use 5 packets per request and
we disabled local caching for HTTP and HTTPS requests.
Our toolkit also triggered a full cipherscan run for each API
endpoint every 12 hours.
Our first test started on August 20th, 2015 and our
second test was started on January 30th, 2018. Both were
kept running for exactly three months and used the identical
deployment and configuration. Afterwards, the analysis of
the vast result set took us almost a year11.
3.4 Reaching Out to Providers
Following our original paper, we contacted the providers
of all analyzed web APIs with the goal of (i) finding ex-
planations for the observed results, (ii) providing feedback
to the providers, and (iii) to explore how easy it is to
reach the providers, i.e., how easy it is for application
developers to get help. For this purpose, we tried to find
contact details for all providers using Google search but
also via contacts of contacts on LinkedIn. To each contact
we found, we tried to send the same text including our
original paper and deviated only where necessary due to
the respective communication channel (e.g., on Twitter). We
describe the results of this reaching out process – including
both observations on contact methods but also on outcomes
of attempted contact – in section 7.
11. The data collected in our experiments is available at
https://github.com/ErikWittern/web-api-benchmarking-data
6Pingability ca. 85%
Pingability ca. 99%
Fig. 2. Pingability of API-6 in February 2018 by Region
4 AVAILABILITY FINDINGS
In this section, we give an overview of our findings regard-
ing availability of web APIs. Reported results are based on
our experiments from both 2015 and 2018.
Finding #1: Pingability. Overall, all APIs show a very
high pingability of around 99% in both 2015 and 2018.
However, all APIs have very different pingability when
comparing regions. This effect is particularly pronounced in
the 2018 measurements for API-6: During the first month of
our measurements, daily pingability went down to about
85% for three out of seven regions while the remaining
regions still had 99% pingability. Figure 2 shows the geo-
graphical distribution of these regions. Beyond API-6, this
was observable for all other APIs as well though less ex-
treme as for these APIs only the number of nines varied.
Table 3 shows the distribution of lost ping packages across
regions; overall, clients in South America appear to have a
higher probability for pingability problems than elsewhere.
Noticeably, API-6 which had the strongest variance and
problems encountered their worst problem in Oregon and
had very good pingability in Sao Paulo. All this, however,
should be taken with a grain of salt as our experiment sent
close to one million ping packages per API in total.
Finding #2: Pingability vs. Availability. In our exper-
iments, we also found that pingability is usually a good
proxy for API availability. This, however, is not always the
case. Figure 3 shows the pingability and accessibility of
API-6 in our 2018 benchmark. As can be seen in the left
part, API-6 had severe pingability problems which were not
related to the overall availability of the HTTP(S) endpoints.
In this period of time, using pingability as a proxy for acces-
sibility would severely underestimate the API accessibility.
In contrast, the right half of the chart shows the expected
TABLE 3
Distribution of Lost Ping Packages Across Regions
API Best Worst Avg Worst Region
API-1 6 211 66 Sao Paulo
API-3 4 374 82 Sao Paulo
API-4 7 74 32 Oregon
API-6 17 5852 2893 Oregon
API-7 6 235 71 Virginia
API-8 1 42 13 Sao Paulo
API-9 20 476 155 Sao Paulo
API-10 0 175 73 Sao Paulo
API-15 0 31 13 Sao Paulo
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Fig. 3. Comparison of Daily Pingability and Accessibility of API-6 in 2018
correlation of pingability and accessibility.
Finding #3: HTTP Status Codes. Based on semantics
of the HTTP protocol, applications are led to believe that
they can expect 4xx HTTP status codes when they have
done something wrong and 5xx when the fault lies with
the server, or a response (2xx or 3xx) otherwise. This could
not be further from the truth. Across all our experiments, we
found that up to nearly 90% of all unavailabilities resulted
in no response at all, i.e., a timeout or a loss of connection.
See table 4 which shows how frequently client-observable
outcomes were a 4xx/5xx status code or some other sort
of failure. Note, that during our 2015 benchmark, we saw
two endpoints permanently going offline (the providers still
exist at the time of writing this paper but deprecated the
respective API endpoints): One permanently switched from
2xx to 4xx codes, the other did this for 48 hours only.
Afterwards, requests failed without returning any status
codes. In table 4, we show the full 2015 datasets as well as
the dataset without these two APIs as both together account
for about 94% of all failed requests in 2015. Overall, we can
only recommend not to rely on the idea of receiving valid
HTTP status codes.
Finding #4: Longevity of API Endpoints. As already
described in finding #3, we saw two endpoints going offline
during our 2015 experiments. Beyond this, four out of
fourteen HTTP endpoints and one out of twelve HTTPS
endpoints from our original paper were no longer available
when we started our 2018 experiments (cf. Table 2). At the
TABLE 4
Distribution of Client-Observable Results (HTTP Status Code or None)
for Failed Requests
Dataset Protocol 4XX 5XX None
2015 (all) HTTP 43% 5% 53%
HTTPS 3% 8% 89%
2015 (w/o HTTP 0% 74% 26%
offline endpoints) HTTPS 0% 89% 11%
2018 HTTP 0% 87% 13%
HTTPS 0% 80% 20%
7TABLE 5
Observed Success Ratios of Protocol or Region Change in Case of
Failures Across all APIs
Dataset Strategy Min Max Avg
2015 (all) REGION CHANGE 7% 100% 86%
HTTP 2 HTTPS 0% 100% 88%
HTTPS 2 HTTP 7% 100% 91%
2015 (w/o REGION CHANGE 89% 100% 98%
offline endpoints) HTTP 2 HTTPS 78% 100% 97%
HTTPS 2 HTTP 94% 100% 99%
2018 REGION CHANGE 93% 100% 99%
HTTP 2 HTTPS 93% 100% 99%
HTTPS 2 HTTP 94% 100% 99%
time of writing this paper in March 2019, another three
endpoints appear to be unavailable (either permanently or
temporarily). All this together indicates that application
developers should not necessarily rely on the longevity
of the API endpoints used. Instead, they should closely
monitor announcements on the provider’s websites and
have contingency plans for using alternative API endpoints.
Finding #5: Correlation of Unavailability Across Re-
gions and Protocols. Based on our detailed result logs,
we also wanted to explore to which degree requests to
the same API endpoint experience the same availability
behavior when sent (i) from different geographical regions
or (ii) via different protocols (HTTP vs. HTTPS). For this
analysis, we synchronized the detailed results logs as much
as possible – requests did not start at the exact same time
due to clock differences on the measurement machines but
also due to shifting request start timestamps (we sadly
implemented our toolkit not using a precise scheduler but
rather relied on Java’s Thread.sleep() method). This means
that the following results should be taken with a grain of
salt as they might underestimate the correlation. The results,
however, still indicate that the effect could be leveraged for
some of the requests. In future work, we plan to explore to
which degree this is possible in practice.
How to read the results presented in Table 5: The Table
reports all aggregated results for different datasets (first
column, for 2015 again with and without the two APIs that
went completely offline) and strategies. For the strategies,
REGION CHANGE succeeds when one is able to successfully
send a request from at least one other region once an
API is not available from a specific region. HTTP 2 HTTPS
and HTTPS 2 HTTP succeed when one is able to successfully
send a request via the respective other protocol from the
same machine once the first request failed. For each API,
we calculated for which percentage of the failed requests
the respective strategy would have been successful. The
numbers in the table show these success ratios – for each
dataset we show the API with the smallest success ratio
(“Min”), with the highest success ratio (“Max”), and the
average across all success ratios.
Yahoo! is a good example to explain how regional dif-
ferences can exist. In their PNUTS paper [14], they describe
how Yahoo! rolls out services globally using the underlying
PNUTS system for geo-replication across data centers. User
requests are then routed to the respectively closest data
center and mastership for data records is adapted based
TABLE 6
Overall Accessibility for HTTP and HTTPS Requests in 2015 and 2018
Dataset Protocol Min Max Avg
2015 (all) HTTP 32.99% 99.992% 91.43%
HTTPS 34.17% 99.990% 93.95%
2015 (w/o HTTP 94.84% 99.992% 99.40%
offline endpoints) HTTPS 94.79% 99.990% 99.38%
2018 HTTP 99.69% 99.998% 99.94%
HTTPS 99.71% 99.993% 99.93%
on user location. If now one data center has availability
problems, then all read requests can be served elsewhere.
The ability to serve update requests depends on whether
the respective master record is stored within the affected
data center.
Finding #6: General Availability Over the Years. Over-
all, availability improved from 2015 to 2018 for all three
protocols. Only API-6 got slightly worse (still operating at
99.98% overall accessibility) and had some problems with
ping as described in finding #2. Ignoring the two offline
endpoints from 2015, availability improved from about
99.4% and 99.38% (HTTP and HTTPS respectively)to 99.94%
and 99.93%. See table 6 which gives an overview of overall
accessibility rates across all APIs in 2015 and 2018.
Conclusion. Overall, we see the main threat to de-
velopers in the longevity of APIs. When we started our
experiment in 2015, we did not expect that so many API
endpoints would be discontinued four years later. We were
surprised when endpoints vanished without warning. Also,
the correlation of availability across regions appears to be
rather low – this makes it a little bit challenging for an
API provider to monitor API availability. Finally, availability
appears to have improved from 2015 to 2018 but developers
should still be careful in their API selection as not all APIs
offer the same availability levels.
5 LATENCY FINDINGS
In this section, we describe findings of analyzing the latency
of web API requests both in 2015 and in 2018, with a focus
on the comparison of these findings. The majority of our
findings are reflected in Figure 4, which uses box plots to
summarize HTTPS latencies per API and region, comparing
results from 2015 (shown in gray) with those of 2018 (shown
in red). We focus on HTTPS to enable comparison with
our previous work [8], and, again, as HTTPS is increasingly
becoming the default transport protocol used in the web.
Finding #1: Inter-Regional Differences. Latency of re-
quests to a single API generally varies significantly depend-
ing on the geographic location of the client. We reported
this finding in previous work [8] and can confirm this for
2018 as well. This variance, which we call geofactor, is for
a specific API best described by first calculating the mean
latency per region latavgi , i ∈ {regions}. Then the geofactor
is calculated as max(latavgi )/min(lat
avg
i ).
In 2015, API-7 had the lowest geofactor at 1.65; in 2018,
this honor went to API-8 at 1.47. In both years, API-5 had
the highest geofactor at 28 (2015) and 32 (2018) respectively.
The average geofactor across all APIs increased from 9 in
2015 to 10.9 in 2018.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of 2015 and 2018 HTTPS Request Latencies Across Regions in Milliseconds
Finding #2: Latency Differences within Regions over
Time. Even within individual regions, the measured re-
sponse times of requests to a single API can vary a lot
over time. Consider, for example, Figure 5, which shows
the histogram of the HTTPS latency measured for API-8 in
region Ireland in 2018 (note that the y-axis uses a log scale).
As can be seen, a large number of requests finished in 30-
150ms. However, another large share of requests requires
between 400-1500ms to finish, indicating the vast latency
variance in this case.
Furthermore, as reported in our previous work [8], there
are significant outliers in the data reaching response times
in the hundreds of seconds, which practically render these
APIs unavailable for those requests. In the 2018 data, 69
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Fig. 5. Histogram of HTTPS Latencies of API-8 in Ireland in 2018
requests across seven APIs take over one minute to complete
– just over half of these belong to API-1.
Finding #3: Geo-Distribution of API Endpoints. Mea-
suring latency from different geographic locations allows,
in some cases, to draw conclusions about the geographic
distribution of API servers. Consider as an example Fig-
ures 6 and 7, which show the average daily latency for API-
8 and API-9 respectively across regions. In case of API-8,
latency values fall into two clusters: they are considerably
worse in Sao Paulo and Sydney as compared to the rest of
the world. Furthermore, the peaks of the regions’ latency
curves are not aligned, indicating that the API is provided
by different servers located in different locations. In contrast,
in the case of API-9, the peaks of the latency curves of all
regions are pretty much aligned, indicating that a single
location is responsible for providing that API. Since the
measured latency is consistently the lowest in Oregon, it can
be assumed that this single API location is closer to Oregon
than all other regions.
In the 2018 measurements, API-9 no longer exhibits the
described behavior. Rather, latency peaks do not align in a
clear way. In fact, in the 2018 measurements, no other API
denotes latencies that align across all regions.
Finding #4: Changes Between Years. One way to depict
the latency changes per API and region between 2015 and
2018 is to look at the 90% percentiles. Doing so allows us
to delimit the distorting effect that outliers have. We find
that, on average across regions, the latency 90-percentiles
increase for 8 APIs, and decrease for 3 APIs. However,
given also the changes in response sizes between the years,
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individual cases need to be considered: the changes for
individual APIs are so different, that aggregated findings
across sets of APIs are questionable. One notable example
is API-4, where we had to replace the previously very
large resource by a much smaller one, which is reflected in
drastically reduced latency in 2018. Another example is API-
7 where, despite the resource size having increased by over
25% between the years, latency has significantly decreased,
across all regions. Possible causes for such improvements
are the use of caching in the API backend or scaled-up
servers to answer requests. API-7 is also an interesting
example when considering the changes of latency variance
between the years. On average across regions, the standard
deviation of latencies of API-7 decreased by 88.2%. On the
other hand, consider API-8, where the standard deviation
grew on average by 193.4% across regions.
In summary, we find that multiple APIs denote stark
changes in latencies and the variance of latency between
2015 and 2018. This finding underlines once more – in
addition to the latency changes we observed in our indi-
vidual 3-month experiments – the necessity for application
developers to a) continuously monitor the quality of service
of the external services they depend on, and eventually to
b) install mechanisms to mitigate occurring problems.
Conclusion. Measuring latency of web APIs reveals se-
vere implications for application developers. They cannot
assume that latency remains constant over time and have to
expect stark latency variance when accessing APIs across the
globe. If web APIs provide functionalities fundamental to an
application, latency variation can have negative impacts on
user attention [4] or even result in lost business [5]. This can
be especially expected in cases where latency (temporarily)
rises to multiple seconds. Application developers should
consider mitigation strategies, as we discussed in previous
work [8] and summarize in Section 8.4.
6 SECURITY FINDINGS
In this section, we describe findings from our security exper-
iments. We base findings partly on the cipher suite security
score and server security score introduced in Section 2.3.3.
Finding #1: Server Security Scores Differ Across APIs.
The different APIs feature very different server security
scores (as defined in Section 2.3.3). Figure 8 shows scores
of APIs in 2015 in region US East. As can be seen, API-8
has the lowest score, with an average of 1.76. On the other
hand, API-6 has the highest score, with an average of 3.69.
Similarly, in 2018, average server security scores range from
1.58 (API-3) to 3.15 (API-4).
Finding #2: Lasting Score Changes in 2015. To charac-
terize whether and how security scores of an API change
during our experiments, we define a lasting change to exist if
the security score changes by at least 1% between measure-
ments, and if the new score is maintained for at least 10 sub-
sequent measurements. This definition of a lasting change
is informed by exploring plots of the evolutions of secu-
rity scores, which denote some outlying scores and some
changes that persist for longer periods (i.e., days/weeks).
We find in the 2015 experiments that out of the 12 APIs, 5
(or 41.7%) denote lasting changes in their security scores (cf.
also Figure 8). Three of these APIs (API-1, API-6, API-7) de-
note a single change, while the other two APIs (API-8, API-
15) denote two lasting changes. In fact, the security scores
of of these two APIs nearly perfectly overlap. Information
obtained prior to anonymization of our data indicates that
these two APIs are deployed on the same managed cloud
infrastructure. Figure 9 shows, as an example, the 2015
evolution of the server security score of API-15, which
has a (positive) lasting change around Oct 20, and another
(negative) lasting change around Oct 26. Notably, in the 2018
data, we find not a single lasting change.
Finding #3: Changes between 2015 and 2018. During
our experiments, the server security scores featured lasting
Fig. 8. Server Security Score Evolution in Region US East in 2015
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Fig. 9. Server Security Score Evolution of API-15 in 2015
TABLE 7
Cipher Suites Appearing only in 2015 Experiments
Suite SCS APIs 2015with support
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA 1.1 4, 6, 9
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA 1.0 4, 6, 9
CAMELLIA256-SHA 0.1 4, 9, 13
CAMELLIA128-SHA 0.0 4 7
ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA -1 1, 8, 10, 15
RC4-MD5 -1 1, 8, 10, 15
changes for only a minority of APIs in 2015, and for no
APIs in 2018. However, the server security scores of all APIs
changed between our two experiments. The median value
of the changes (no matter if positive or negative) is 18%,
with a smallest change of 1.7% (a negative change; API-7)
and a maximum change of 27.42% (also a negative change;
API-3). In six cases, the score in 2018 is lower than in 2015,
in the remaining five cases it is the other way round.
Finding #4: Server Security Scores are the Same Across
Regions. We find that the security scores of APIs were,
largely, the same across regions in both 2015 and 2018. I.e.,
we find no case where security scores were different for
long periods of time, or where a lasting change (as defined
in Finding #2) occurred in one region but not in others
regions (within at least a few days). The largest time interval
between lasting changes appeared for API-15, where the
score lastingly decreased from 1.85 to 1.77 in region Ireland
midday EST of Oct 25, 2015 while the same change occurred
in Oregon only midday EST on Oct 27 (i.e., two days later).
Finding #4: Discontinuation of Cipher Suites. We ob-
serve six cipher suites that are only present in the 2015 data.
Table 7 shows these suites, their cipher suite security score,
and the APIs that support them in the 2015 data. Notably,
the cipher suite security scores range from -1 to 1.1, i.e., these
suites include the whole spectrum of scores (and not only,
for example, badly scoring suites).
Finding #5: Reduced Use of Insecure Cipher Suites.
Our cipher suite security score assigns a minimum value of
-1 to suites that have known vulnerabilities. For example,
the RC4 algorithm is known to be vulnerable and was
prohibited from use in TLS by the Internet Engineering
Task Force in 201512. When counting the frequency in which
cipher suites with a score of -1 appear across APIs and across
regions, we find 31,316 occurrences in 2015 and only 6775
12. For details, cf. https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465
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Fig. 10. Availability of Contact Methods and Results of Reaching Out to
Providers
occurrences in 2018. While this improvement is not reflected
in the evolution of server security scores between the years
(cf. Finding #3), it does indicate that over time the “worst
offenders” are removed.
Conclusion. Quantifying security is a notoriously hard
if not impossible challenge. We defined cipher suite/server
security scores not to make absolute statements about se-
curity of APIs, but to be able to compare APIs and assess
the changes over time. The server security scores of an API
are closely related across regions, with only short temporal
discrepancy. Also, we only found lasting changes of server
security scores in the 2015 experiments. However, consid-
ering the full picture of measurements between 2015 and
2018, we find that all APIs feature changes in security scores,
and that these changes are not necessarily leading to higher
security. We find, though, that the use of insecure cipher
suites has dropped from 2015 to 2018.
7 FINDINGS FROM REACHING OUT
In this section, we give an overview of the results of reaching
out to all API providers from our original paper [8].
In our assessment, we decided that email or an official
API contact form is the best way of contacting a provider
as it provides (i) a dedicated contact channel (other than
a forum that might or might not be monitored) and (ii)
a way of communicating potentially sensitive information
of the API user. We believe that Twitter and online forums
are the second best options as on these channels contact
attempts are more likely to be overlooked and also, e.g.,
in the case of Twitter, require users to entrust potentially
sensitive data to a third party. Finally, we ranked all other
contact methods worse than this (but better than no contact
method). Following this reasoning, we first tried to find an
official contact form or support email address for the API.
If that was not successful we tried Twitter or online forums.
If that also did not work we tried any other contact method
that we could find via Google search.
Finding #1: Availability of Contact Methods. We were
able to find contact forms or official support email addresses
for eight (out of fifteen) APIs, four had Twitter profiles. For
the other APIs, we contacted one via an existing “contact of
a contact” on LinkedIn, for one we found a self-proclaimed
“senior developer” of the API on GitHub and his email
address via Google search. Finally, we found one personal
website on which the respective person claimed that API
(and provided some contact details).
Finding #2: Quality of Responses (Email/Contact
Form). Of our eight contact requests via official support
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emails or contact forms, two resulted in interesting conver-
sations where the API provider appeared interested in our
results and provided helpful comments. Three of the eight
requests resulted in either an automated email or an email
that was a bit more personalized which indicated that our
request had been forwarded to the respective development
teams and that we would get a response soon. Another three
requests were completely ignored.
Finding #3: Quality of Responses (Twitter). Of the four
requests we sent via Twitter to the respective API support
handles, one provider was very interested and provided
helpful comments leading to an email-based discussion.
Another provider asked us to send them a private message
with further details but we did not receive an answer to that.
The last two providers ignored our requests completely.
Finding #4: Quality of Responses for Other Contact
Methods. Neither of the three contact requests did result in
any reaction of the API provider. See also Figure 10 which
gives an overview of all responses.
Finding #5: Quality of Responses (Summary). All in
all, only three out of fifteen providers provided helpful
comments and were actually approachable. There was no
correlation with the provider size, country, or industry.
Finding #6: Insights Gained. Aside from the meta-
information on whether we received answers or not, we
also learned some architectural details. For instance, one
of the APIs provides their content strictly read-only. In
their deployments, they bundle API code and a database
instance. This makes it relatively easy to guarantee high
availability and performance as the number of replicas is
only restricted by the available budget. Other APIs have it
much harder as their backends are subject to the well-known
tradeoffs of PACELC [15] and other scalability restrictions.
Conclusion. Overall, developers should not rely on the
ability to reach API providers in case of problems. Based on
our observations, we believe that it is a rare exception when
developers can get support unless they are explicitly paying
for it. We would recommend to primarily use APIs that are
at least well documented and preferably widely used.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss threats to validity of results and
what we did to mitigate those threats. We also discuss
implications on application engineering.
8.1 Dying Processes
In this work, we set out to repeat experiments originally
performed in 2015 and published in previous work [8]. We
actually initiated this repetition twice: once in late 2017, and
once in early 2018. During the experiments performed in
2017 – the results of which are not reported here – we noticed
that our measurement process had crashed on some virtual
machines, without producing any error logs. This happened
despite our implementation being written to catch all Java
exceptions to at least log them in terms of handling. The
processes, however, had crashed without a trace. This could
have three reasons: First, there might be a bug that we have
not found yet. Second, there might be a bug in the JVM that
we used. Third, Amazon might have restarted the VM that
our tool was running on.
In consequence of a process dying, all HTTP and HTTPS
measurements from the affected region are stopped, which
renders the entire experiment data unusable. Upon notic-
ing this threat in our 2017 experiments, we stopped the
experiment and restarted from scratch. We extended our
measurement client with a simple HTTP server, running
in the same process, and used the Uptime Robot service
to continuously monitor the availability of that server (cf.
Section 3.1). Uptime Robot uses a 5-minute monitoring
interval. In case of a crash of the measurement client, we
could restart it to continue collecting data.
Fortunately, this threat did not materialize in our 2015
experiments. We performed the 2018 experiments having
the HTTP server in combination with Uptime Robot in place
as a safety mechanism. During the 2018 experiment, we did
also not observe any process dying.
8.2 Dying Threads
A threat in addition to a whole process (i.e., the JVM) dying
is that individual threads, responsible for measuring one
API endpoint, die during an experiment. Being pointed to
this possibility, we re-assessed our 2015 data and found
indeed cases where individual threads had disappeared.
The consequence of this observation is twofold: It requires
us to correct findings reported in our original work [8].
It also led us to improve our experiment setup and data
analysis further to be able to react more quickly to dying
threads.
Correction of Findings in Previous Work The unex-
pected death of measurement threads, inexplicably happen-
ing without any log entries, meant that data collected in
the 2015 experiments has numerous missing data points.
Specifically, manual analysis of the raw collected data re-
veals that 26 (or 10.0%) of the 259 measurement threads
(7 regions, 14 HTTP, 12 HTTPS, 11 ICMP endpoints) died
during the experiments – dying threads appeared only for
HTTP and HTTPS measurements. The death of threads
produced no error logs, and subsequent data points were
simply missing. Our original data analysis wrongly interpo-
lated these missing data points to mean that the server was
unreachable, leading to us over-reporting unavailabilities
of APIs in Table 2 in our paper [8]. In Section 4 of this
paper, we present corrected availability figures, where we
no longer attribute missing data points to mean that the
API was unavailable.
Improvements of Experiment Setup and Data Analysis
We applied a set of measures to improve our experiment
setup and subsequent data analysis to prevent repeating the
described errors:
• We implemented a website, returned by the HTTP
server implemented to check for dying processes (cf.
Section 8.1), that reports the last timestamp and mea-
surement value of every single measurement thread
running on the same server. This website grants us on-
demand insight into the proper working of all threads
on a benchmarking client.
• We re-wrote our analysis scripts for availability from
scratch in Java, thus having an additional implementa-
tion (besides our updated Python script that used the
pandas library). For both versions of the data analysis
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code, we wrote additional test cases and compared their
outputs to improve their reliability.
8.3 Other Threats to Validity
As in our original paper, our experiments targeted selected
endpoints. The findings from our experiments can, thus, not
necessarily be generalized to the overall API from which
the endpoint stems. For example, providers may choose
to remove an endpoint we benchmarked, while other end-
points of the same API remain available. Another aspect is
that we only used GET requests – due to caching, actual
availabilities may be worse. Nonetheless, we deem our
results valid examples of how web API qualities can impact
applications, which ultimately rely on specific endpoints.
Depending on the API, GET may even be the standard way
of accessing it, e.g., for maps APIs.
We, furthermore, limited our experiments to endpoints
that do not require authentication. One might argue that
these endpoints may be of less importance to their providers
and may, thus, undergo less scrutiny than other endpoints.
Nonetheless, these endpoints may well be used by ap-
plications and the here presented findings should, hence,
be considered relevant to application developers. Still, our
observations should not be generalized to endpoints with
mandatory authentication in place.
8.4 Implications for Application Engineering
In our original paper, we discussed that API consumers are
directly affected by provider decisions and have no control
over the consumed service which was also visible in the re-
sults [8]. Namely, latency and availability varied depending
on the geo-origin of requests and in general showed a high
variance. Also, endpoints vanished during our experiment.
As a consequence, we recommended to rely on a variety of
mechanisms such as caching, request queuing, monitoring,
and API notification services13. We also discussed prelimi-
nary ideas for a geo-distributed middleware which acts as
a proxy and performs protocol changes or tunnels requests
through other regions when necessary and feasible.
Overall, none of these recommendations have become
invalid. What is most disturbing, though, is the sheer num-
ber of API endpoints that does no longer exist in 2018 –
and neither of these endpoints is for an API that might be
simply obsolete such as a service that returns information on
outdated technology. Based on this, we can only recommend
to actively look for API alternatives (e.g., Google Maps
and Bing Maps) or to build upon APIs that could be self-
hosted if necessary (e.g., Open Street Maps). In terms of
reaching out, developers should not expect much customer
support (this might be better for APIs with a paid plan)
so that we would recommend to carefully check existing
documentation and developer forums before committing to
an API. Finally, security-wise, we have seen that many APIs
still support obsolete cipher suites. Since the server selects
the cipher suite, we would recommend to restrict the set
of supported cipher suites on the client to modern ones
only so that downgrades are no longer possible. This also
asserts that users are less affected by varying cipher suite
preferences of providers.
13. e.g., https://www.apichangelog.com
9 RELATED WORK
In this section, we give an overview of related work starting
web API evolution before continuing with benchmarking in
general and web API benchmarking in particular.
9.1 Web API Evolution
Some works have studied how web APIs evolve, charac-
terizing change patterns and resulting challenges for appli-
cation developers [16], and assessing how developers react
to these changes [17]. Focusing on implications on applica-
tions, Espinha et al. have shown that mobile applications
show diverse behavior in light of web API evolution [6].
Nearly a third of applications crash in light of the removal
of fields from response messages, highlighting severe conse-
quences that affect user experiences. In a similar vain, Aue
et al. report from a single payment API provider’s point of
view about the cause and scope of erroneous integrations –
reflected by millions of error logs [3]. These works underline
the important role web APIs play for many applications.
In contrast to these works, we do not address web API
evolution, i.e., how the functionality of a web API changes,
but the rather focus on web API qualities, i.e., its changing
non-functionalities. We argue that these two perspectives
complement one another, and can have similar importance.
Errors due to faulty integration or issues caused by un-
availabilities, security issues, or high latency can equally
threaten how users experience applications. Similar, both
API providers and consuming developers are challenged
to avoid such issues, relying for example on the mitigation
strategies hinted at in Section 8.4.
9.2 Web API Characteristics and Ecosystems
A wide array of related works assess what web APIs exist,
how they are used, and how they can be characterized. Early
studies of API ecosystems focused on ProgrammableWeb, a
community-maintained catalog of web APIs. Analyses have
explored the evolution of this ecosystem [18], [19], how APIs
in ProgrammableWeb are (reportedly) used in mashups [20],
or utilized such usage relations to recommend web APIs to
developers [2], [21]. Other studies assessed web API usage
outside of ProgrammableWeb, and specifically in the context
of mobile applications. For example, Oumaziz et al. perform
static analysis on mobile applications to assess if and to
what extent they interact with web APIs [22]. Rapoport
et al. combine static analysis with a dynamic execution of
selected mobile applications, exploring how to best detect
consumption of web APIs [23]. Finally, Wittern et al. studied
how to detect the use of web APIs in JavaScript-based ap-
plication code mined from GitHub using static analysis [24].
These works underline the importance of web APIs for
application developers, and an increasing recognition of
related challenges and research opportunities [25].
Yet another set of works assess characteristics of existing
web APIs. Rodriguez et al. extract web API requests from
large volumes of HTTP traffic logs and assess their adher-
ence to various design principles, including proper use of
HTTP verbs or how URLs are structured [26]. Neumann et
al. manually identify web APIs among popular web sites
and assess their documentations for a similar set of design
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principles [27]. We again see our work to complement these
approaches, which focus on design aspects of APIs, as this
work focuses on runtime qualities.
9.3 Benchmarking
Benchmarking comprises a number of different areas. The
oldest area is concerned with quantifying performance of
(virtual) machines. These include many SPEC14 benchmarks
or collections such as the Phoronix Test Suite15 but also
more recent developments, e.g., [28] which uses WordPress
as a realistic benchmark application. Another well-studied
area is the benchmarking of database systems which, in
the last few years, has evolved from relational database
benchmarks such as the well-established TPC16 benchmarks
towards modern NoSQL datastores. For instance, the de
facto standard YCSB [29] and its extensions [30], [31] in-
troduced database benchmarking based on CRUD inter-
faces, which are more compatible with modern NoSQL
stores like Apache Cassandra [32]. Other approaches such
as OLTPBench [33] or BenchFoundry [34], [35] aim to build
comprehensive multi-quality benchmarking platforms that
also include measurement approaches for qualities beyond
performance, e.g., data consistency [10], [36]–[39] or elastic
scalability [11], [12]. Beyond this, there are a number of ap-
proaches studying performance impacts of TLS on NoSQL
datastores [40]–[42], web services [43], and web servers [44].
Neither of these approaches is directly comparable to the
work presented in this paper as these approaches all have
in common that they stress the system under test while our
approach is more lightweight and does not create significant
load on web APIs. In this regard, it is more comparable
to monitoring approaches [45]. For an extended discussion
of the broad area of benchmarking – this list is by no
means exhaustive, we refer to our recent book on cloud
service benchmarking [9] or foundational publications on
the principles of benchmarking such as [46]–[50].
To our knowledge, this paper and our original paper [8]
are the only publications that aim to quantify quality of ser-
vice of web APIs through geo-distributed long-term experi-
ments. Other measurement approaches such as artillery.io 17
can be used to run load tests against web APIs. This,
however, is explicitly forbidden in the terms of service of
all APIs that we have looked at (which includes a longer list
than those used for our experiments). As such, it is unlikely
to provide insights into the behavior of web APIs “in the
wild” or needs to be run by the provider.
10 CONCLUSION
Over the last few years, web APIs have found widespread
adoption in mobile and web applications. Hence, quality
behavior of web APIs more and more affects user experience
of such applications – from a developer perspective, this is
highly problematic as they have absolutely no control over
the API and its quality.
In 2016, we published a conference paper on bench-
marking of web APIs [8]. For this paper, we extended our
14. https://www.spec.org/
15. https://www.phoronix-test-suite.com/
16. http://www.tpc.org
17. https://artillery.io/
original benchmarking tool and repeated the three-month
experiment. Of the original 15 APIs from 2015, there were in
2018 only 11 left. For all these, we reported detailed results
and corresponding insights on availability, performance,
and security behavior. We also analyzed to which degree
the API providers can be contacted and actually respond to
inquiries.
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